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The Basel II framework:
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General Secretariat of the Commission bancaire
Discussions on the reform of the “Basel I” capital ratio, or “Cooke” ratio, which dates from 1988, were 
initiated in the late 1990s under the aegis of the Basel Committee. They culminated in June 2004 with the 
publication of a new Accord on international convergence of capital measurement and capital standards, 
commonly referred to as “Basel II”. The new Accord was updated in November 2005 to incorporate several 
technical additions.
The Basel II framework is designed to permit a more risk-sensitive and more comprehensive coverage 
of banking risks. It consists of three complementary and mutually reinforcing “pillars”. Pillar 1 consists
of the basic minimum capital requirements. Pillar 2 introduces the principle of a structured dialogue
between banking institutions and supervisors. Pillar 3 is focused on transparency and market discipline.
Each of these three pillars represents a major innovation, marking the transition from a prudential framework 
based on simple quantitative rules to a more complete set of standards which, in addition to using a more 
risk-sensitive quantitative approach, incorporates qualitative principles that institutions are expected to 
comply with. However, Pillar 2 has a unique characteristic that distinguishes it from the other two Pillars.
It reafﬁ  rms and provides a rationale for the existing practice of many supervisors: conducting a quantitative 
and qualitative review of all risks using their own tools but also the processes for risk monitoring developed 
by banks themselves. These reviews may lead to various supervisory measures, including the imposition 
of additional capital requirements under Pillar 2.
The extensive consultations conducted in the past few years between supervisors and the banking industry 
have gradually led to the implications of Basel II being taken on board by all of the parties concerned. 
First of all, institutions focused on adapting their information systems to the requirements laid down in 
Pillar 1. For a long time, Pillar 2 was the least commented on part of the Basel reform. However, the entry 
into force of the new ratio will take place from the beginning of 2007 –in France as in the other countries
of the European Economic Area– since the transposition of the Accord into Community law has taken the 
form of a new Capital requirements directive (CRD). In the run-up to this deadline, Pillar 2 has become a 
major topic of discussion between banks and their supervisors, and it therefore seems opportune to further 
clarify how the Commission bancaire will implement Pillar 2. 
In particular, the cross-border implementation of the new framework raises many questions, to which 
European supervisors have responded by developing rules that are as harmonised as possible. 
Beyond these considerations, thought needs to be given to the fundamental purpose of Pillar 2 and to its 
practical implementation. The increased risk-sensitivity of capital requirements under Pillar 1 undeniably 
represents a major advance, but it results in increased correlation of capital requirements with the 
business cycle, the degree of which will be speciﬁ  c to each institution. From the perspective of micro
and macro-prudential stability, the ﬂ  uctuations in the regulatory ratio that might result from this correlation 
must be understood and, if possible, kept in check. This article seeks to show how this objective could 
be achieved through a possible approach to Pillar 2 involving the putting in place of a capital cushion in 
addition to the regulatory minimum.ARTICLES
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C
onceived as a framework that goes beyond 
simple minimum capital requirements, the 
Basel II reform consists of three complementary 
and mutually reinforcing elements. 
• Pillar 1 sets minimum requirements for capital. 
Its aim is to ensure that banking institutions hold 
sufﬁ   cient capital to provide a minimum level
of coverage for their credit risk, market risk,
and operational risk. The innovation of Basel II, 
compared with the capital ratio of Basel I, is not only 
that it covers a broader range of risks (for example,
the “Cooke” ratio does not implicitly capture 
operational risk), but also that it allows banks to 
choose between different levels of sophistication in 
the calculation of capital requirements. Thus they 
will be able, for credit risk and operational risk,
to use either a set of standard risk weights that 
are a function of the quality of the counterparty,1
or (risk weights based on) internal ratings.2
•  Pillar 2 establishes a process of prudential 
supervision that complements and strengthens 
Pillar 1. It consists of  the analysis by the bank
of all of its risks, including those already covered by 
Pillar 1; the calculation by the bank of the amount 
of economic capital it needs to cover those risks; 
and the comparison by the banking supervisor
of its own analysis of the bank’s risk proﬁ  le with the 
analysis conducted by the bank, to inform its choice 
of prudential measures, which may take the form 
of capital requirements greater than the minimum 
requirements or any other appropriate technique. 
• Pillar 3 is concerned with market discipline. Its aim 
is to improve the ﬁ  nancial transparency of banks
by requiring them to disclose the information needed 
by outside parties to form an accurate and complete 
view of their capital adequacy. It is hoped that this 
will improve market discipline.
These three elements form an indivisible whole. 
However, the implementation of Pillars 1 and 3 
depends primarily on the actions of the institutions 
– while recognising that supervisors should also 
be transparent in this regard, as is illustrated by
the requirement that has been imposed on them
to publish, by the end of 2006 at the latest, the 
national legislation transposing the European 
capital adequacy directive. By contrast, Pillar 2 can 
be understood only in the context of a structured 
and documented dialogue between banks and 
supervisors. 
Pillar 2 has another particularity: banking supervisors 
have long “practised” it without knowing it. The 
innovation of Basel II is simply to systematise 
and thereby make more uniform and consistent 
approaches that until now have generally been 
implemented in isolation.
The remainder of this study provides greater 
detail on the deﬁ  nition and methods of application
of Pillar 2 (1|). We endeavour to show how Pillar 2 
can be used to limit the volatility of the capital ratio 
resulting from the greater risk-sensitivity of the 
Basel II framework (2|).
1| UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES
OF PILLAR 2 AND THE IMPORTANCE
OF HARMONISED IMPLEMENTATION
AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL
1|1  Three major components 
A reading of the Basel and European texts makes it 
possible to group the major features and objectives 
of Pillar 2 around the following key principles: 
• Banks should set in place systems for assessing 
the adequacy of their economic capital in relation to 
their risk proﬁ  le, and should maintain an appropriate 
level of capital at all times. This is the internal 
capital adequacy assessment process (ICAAP).
1  For credit risk, this is the “standardised approach”, which consists in applying a risk weight to exposures that is a function of the intrinsic quality of the counterparty, 
based on the rating assigned by an external credit assessment institution, which may be a rating agency or another organisation. For operational risk, two approaches 
are based on this logic. In one, the “basic indicator approach”, a single risk weight is applied to an indicator of income which is close in conceptual terms to net 
banking income. The other, the “standardised approach”, is more elaborate: the various business lines of the institution allow a more detailed breakdown of the 
income indicator, and thus the risk-weight scale is broader and more representative of the level of risk.
2 In the internal ratings based approach (IRB approach) to credit risk, institutions will be able to calculate all of the parameters used in the calculation of capital requirements. 
The institution itself calculates the probability of default, the loss given default, and the credit conversion factors (the «advanced» IRB approach), or only some of them 
(the “foundation” IRB approach, in which the institution itself determines the probability of default, the other parameters being set by the regulations).ARTICLES
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The analysis should incorporate all risks, including 
those not covered by Pillar 1. These encompass 
not only risks that are quantiﬁ  able (interest rate 
risk in the non-trading book, concentration risk, 
transformation risk, and the residual risk that 
remains when collateral is lower than expected), but 
also risks that require a more qualitative approach 
(such as reputational and strategic risk).
• The banking supervisor compares its own analysis 
of the bank’s risk proﬁ  le with that conducted by the 
institution, and, based on its conclusions, may take 
prudential measures, which may involve setting capital 
requirements above minimum requirements or any 
other appropriate technique. This is the supervisory 
review and evaluation process, or SREP.
• It is important for supervisors to practise preventive 
supervision: they should intervene at a sufﬁ  ciently 
early stage to prevent institutions’ capital from 
falling below minimum requirements. 
The application of these principles should be 
proportionate to the magnitude of the risks incurred; 
each risk should be considered not only in isolation 
but also in terms of its relative magnitude in 
comparison with other risks. 
1|2 Close links with current practices
  and some aspects
  of current regulations
Pillar 1 of the Basel II framework means that 
supervisors attach greater importance to data 
produced by the institutions themselves, particularly 
data used in the internal approaches to calculating 
capital requirements for credit risk, market risk, and 
operational risk.
Similarly, Pillar 2 assigns an important role to 
processes developed internally by banks for 
monitoring and controlling all their risks, and to 
processes developed by the supervisors themselves. 
Nevertheless, this freedom is limited by the 
regulatory texts and by more detailed supervision 
of institutions, made possible by tools that are 
themselves more precise.
Banking supervisors did not wait for Basel II to take 
a close interest in this process. In France, regulation 
CRBF 97-02, which has been amended several times 
since it was issued, speciﬁ  es the rules that institutions 
must comply with in the area of internal control. 
In addition to regulatory provisions such as those 
introduced by regulation 97-02, supervisors have 
a long-standing practice of complementing their 
review of regulatory ratios with qualitative analyses 
of banks’ internal management, particularly in the 
area of the monitoring of risks and transactions. 
Nevertheless, Pillar 2 does much more than 
synthesise or provide a legal basis for supervisory 
practices already in place. It not only introduces a 
detailed methodology for analysing risks and the 
internal processes used by institutions to monitor 
them, it also introduces the principle of a structured 
dialogue between institutions and supervisors, who 
have their own tools. This is one of the principal 
innovations of the new Accord, along with the 
possibility for banks to use internal approaches to 
calculate their regulatory capital requirements. 
1|3  Vigilance by banks to ensure
 harmonised  implementation
  of Pillar 2 and convergence
  in supervisory practices
Pillar 2 has an international dimension, to which 
the major banks have, justiﬁ  ably, not failed to attach 
importance. Although the issue of convergence in 
supervisory practices is not peculiar to Pillar 2, it  has 
particular relevance there, since the implementation 
of Pillar 2 leaves broad scope for qualitative 
assessment and thus for subjective judgement.
In the course of the various consultative processes, 
banking institutions have underlined their concern 
about the possibility that supervisors in different 
countries might adopt divergent approaches to the 
implementation of Pillar 2. If nothing were done to 
address this risk, we could end up with a situation 
in which multinational groups would be required to 
satisfy as many additional requirements as they have 
foreign establishments. Issues concerning the scope 
of application are another source of concern, at least 
in Europe, where the CRD stipulates that economic 
capital is to be calculated only on a consolidated 
basis for groups but that a SREP must be conducted 
for each individual entity. ARTICLES
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In addition, banks fear that for some supervisors 
Pillar 2 will simply be an instrument for instituting 
an  unjustiﬁ  ed tightening of prudential requirements, 
and that arbitrary administrative authority will 
prevail over the relevance of the assessment. 
These concerns have contributed to a more 
fundamental fear stemming from the methodological 
uncertainties relating to Pillar 2. Pillar 2 is indeed 
based primarily on general principles, in contrast to 
Pillar 1, whose provisions are prescriptive in nature 
and, for the most part, detailed and precise.
The expression of all of these fears has served as 
a catalyst for discussions within the Committee 
of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) aimed 
at reducing as much as possible the risk of 
divergent application of the framework. Initiated 
in 2004, these discussions were followed by a 
long period of consultation designed to enable 
extensive exchanges with banks and different 
European supervisors on this subject, and 
culminating in the publication of guidelines
on 25 January 2006.3
These guidelines deﬁ  ne useful concepts in achieving 
consistent implementation of Pillar 2, both for 
banks (ICAAP and internal governance) and for 
supervisors (SREP). The guidelines help to remove 
any methodological uncertainty. In areas where 
industry has wished to obtain further clariﬁ  cation 
(for example, the treatment of interest rate risk in 
the non-trading book, or stress-testing), it has been 
decided that CEBS would conduct further analysis 
and reﬁ  ne its guidelines.
This work on the implementation of Pillar 2 was 
complemented by another initiative, which is 
not limited to Pillar 2, but essential in this area: 
the development of guidelines for strengthening
co-operation between supervisors of multinational 
groups. These guidelines establish arrangements 
for the exchange of information between home 
and host supervisors, as well as a framework for
co-ordinating prudential activities –particularly 
those relating to Pillar 2– under the authority
of the home supervisor:
• the home supervisor (on a consolidated basis)
co-ordinates the preparation of the risk assessment 
using the information provided by the host 
supervisors (subsidiaries);
• the two (or more) supervisors agree on the planning 
and co-ordination of supervisory activities;
•  they divide up between them the tasks to be 
accomplished or perform them jointly;
• they agree on the outcomes of supervisory actions, 
data collection, etc.
Finally, at a practical level, operational networks have 
been set up for the prudential supervision of the major 
European banking groups. Each such network brings 
together, under the authority of the home supervisor, 
the different host supervisors of a given group. These 
networks allow the practical issues raised by the 
implementation of Pillar 2 to be addressed. 
Following the example of what has been
accomplished at the European level, the Basel 
Committee, through its Accord Implementation 
Group, is holding its own discussions on the methods 
for applying the provisions of Pillar 2. 




The new regulatory capital ratio will make it possible 
to capture the intrinsic quality of risks much more 
precisely than the current framework. This results, 
however, in a degree of correlation between capital 
requirements and the economic environment, 
and, consequently, an increase in the variability of 
capital requirements over the course of the business 
cycle (see Box). Furthermore, the introduction of 
new accounting standards (IFRS) has resulted in the 
market valuation of a greater number of the assets 
and liabilities that ﬁ  gure in “risk-weighted assets” 
in the denominator of the ratio, or capital in the 
numerator. This may also increase the volatility 
of the capital ratio.
3  CEBS “Guidelines on the application of the supervisory review process under Pillar 2”.ARTICLES
The Basel II framework: the role and implementation of Pillar 2
Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 9 • December 2006  121
Too much volatility in the ratio is to be avoided, from 
the perspective both of investors and supervisors:
• For investors, the predictability of the short- to 
medium-term ﬁ  nancial condition of institutions is 
a decisive element in their asset allocation policies. 
Too much variation in the ratio would be perceived 
as a risk factor likely to render access to markets 
more difﬁ  cult, or to increase the cost of ﬁ  nancing.
• From the standpoint of supervisors, the capital 
ratio should be relatively resilient given that the 
degree of exposure of banks to microeconomic or 
macroeconomic risks is especially pronounced by 
virtue of the role they play in ﬁ  nancing various 
sectors. Too much instantaneous volatility would 
appear to indicate a lack of ﬁ  nancial robustness.
Setting a target ratio arrived at by adding a capital 
cushion to the regulatory minimum, in the context 
Box
The inﬂ  uence of the business cycle on internal ratings in the Basel II framework 
By construction, the increased risk-sensitivity of capital requirements introduces a degree of correlation between the level 
of the regulatory capital ratio and the business cycle. Whereas under the Basel I framework, a business ﬁ  rm is assigned 
a ﬁ  xed risk weight of 100%, whatever its ﬁ  nancial condition, under the internal ratings based approach set out in Basel II, 
the capital charge is much more sensitive to the condition of a given counterparty, and, consequently, to the economic 
environment in which the counterparty operates. 
The methods for determining the parameters of the risk-weighting function –the probability of default and the loss given 
default– have been designed to avoid excessive volatility in internal ratings. In particular, the estimation period used should
be long enough for the parameters to be stable in the short term and easily predictable. For example, calculations for the 
probabilities of default are based on ﬁ  ve-year averages,1 unless a different factor that better captures the position in the 
business cycle is also incorporated (for the sectors or businesses for which this is justiﬁ  ed).
Nevertheless, several empirical studies have shown that the behaviour of capital requirements calculated using the Internal 
ratings based approach follows relatively closely that of the business cycle. Calculations by the Basel Committee indicate 
that the ﬂ  uctuations in the new regulatory ratio should on average represent 35%-40% of the ﬂ  uctuations in economic 
growth. Indeed, the Basel Committee includes a “damping” factor, which is greater than 50%, linked to its methods
of calculation.
The degree of pro-cyclicality is also affected by two sets of microeconomic parameters: 
• The ﬁ  rst concerns the risk proﬁ  le of each banking institution and how it evolves over time, the amplitude and speed of this
process being speciﬁ  c to each institution. Thus, the degree of correlation between internal ratings and the business cycle 
may be increased or lessened depending on the business activity of each institution and its appetite for risk. 
• The second relates to the type of model used to assign internal ratings, in particular in the advance approach, which gives 
institutions broad latitude to opt for speciﬁ  cations that reinforce or reduce the pro-cyclicality of the ratio.
1  The transition clauses of the CRD provide, however, that a shorter historical observation period can be used if needed.
of Pillar 2, might offer a methodological and 
systematised solution to this problem. 
2|1  Setting a target capital ratio 
The determination of the target capital ratio would 
be based on the supervisors’ analysis of all the 
quantitative and qualitative risks of a group: those 
coming under Pillar 1 as well as those covered by 
Pillar 2. The target ratio would have a stabilising 
effect on the capital coverage of ﬁ  nancial activities, 
since it would ﬂ  uctuate much less than the regulatory 
ratio. Indeed, the qualitative factors that form part 
of the target ratio are only partially independent
of the business cycle, or change more slowly than 
the quantitative factors.
It is this target ratio that, after discussions with the 
institution, supervisors would ask the institution to ARTICLES
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satisfy (and not to disclose). In practice, it would 
be above the regulatory ratio, insofar as prudential 
measures would be taken well before actual capital 
levels fall too close to the regulatory threshold. 
Furthermore, the assessment used to set the target 
ratio needs to have a certain constancy over time in 
order to be effective.
Moreover, given that the bank would itself need a 
safety margin of in relation to the target ratio, to 
be sure of satisfying it in all circumstances, the 
actual ratio held and published in the context
of its operations would be greater than the target 
ratio and more stable than the regulatory ratio. 
The target ratio would thus have a smoothing effect, 
as illustrated in Chart 1.
The combination of a minimum regulatory ratio 
(Pillar 1) and a target ratio (Pillar 2) would provide 
the beneﬁ  ts both of a risk-sensitive calculation 
mechanism and a capital level that is reasonably 
stable over time. 
This approach based on a target ratio should, however, 
be distinguished from the calculation of economic 
capital. The latter serves primarily as an internal 
management tool for bank managers, who seek
to provide an adequate return to shareholders and an 
optimal allocation of capital across different business 
lines. Economic capital appears to need to be lower than 
that necessary for the target ratio, which is intended
to cover a longer time horizon (see Chart 2).
2|2 Implementation of the target ratio
The target ratio should be set as part of the Pillar 2 
process of prudential review conducted by the supervisor 
in consultation with bank managers. This ratio, which 
should be known only to the bank and its supervisor, 
should be complied with, but with a temporary adjustment 
Chart 1
The smoothing effect of the target ratio









Regulatory ratio (Pillar 1)
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Note: The regulatory ratio moves in the opposite direction to the business cycle;
the target ratio, which includes variables not correlated with the business cycle,
ﬂ  uctuates less; the actual ratio is managed over time in order to reduce ﬂ  uctuations.
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margin around the target when necessary, the size of 
which will depend upon real and approved needs.
The methods for implementing Pillar 2 will allow a 
dialogue between banks and supervisors, which in 
many cases already exists on a less formal basis. In 
this regard, case studies carried out at the European 
level (through the operational networks of the 
CEBS) or at the international level (in the Accord 
Implementation Group of the Basel Committee), 
should have as their objective to come up with 
solutions that can be applied consistently from one 
banking group to the next, irrespective of the country 
in which the parent company is established. 
The target ratio would be set taking into account the 
various “tools” that are speciﬁ  c to Pillar 2, notably:
• stress tests designed to provide an assessment of 
the sensitivity of capital measures to changes in the 
economic environment or events affecting markets 
and liquidity;
•  an examination of the factors underlying 
concentration risk, liquidity risk, interest rate risk, 
reputational and strategic risk, internal control risk, 
management risk and governance risk.
In France, the Commission bancaire will implement 
such an approach when it updates its tools for the 
“Organisation for the reinforcement of preventive 
action”, in the context of a structured dialogue 
with banking groups. This approach meets the 
long-standing expectations of rating agencies.
It is already commonly agreed that a Tier 1 ratio
of 6% to 6.5% represents a minimum level in terms 
of the expectations of the market. Furthermore, 
under the current regulatory framework, 
supervisors have for the most part been led, 
depending on the particular circumstances of each 
institution, to require a ratio well in excess of the 
regulatory minimum. This has been the case for 
several years in France and in other countries, 
where banks already operate at capital levels above 
minimum requirements.
Pillar 2 of the Basel II framework is often presented simply as an enlargement of the power of supervisors. 
In reality, it allows them above all to be involved in the analysis of the internal processes developed
by institutions to manage their risks. The richness of the dialogue that is to take place in this framework 
should yield a better understanding of the expectations of both supervisors and institutions.
Since, by virtue of its greater risk-sensitivity, the regulatory capital ratio in the new prudential framework is 
more closely correlated with the business cycle than the current ratio, corrective measures need to be sought,
in particular via the possibilities for adjustment offered by Pillar 2. 
Setting a target capital ratio is one possible solution, which is close to the current practices of markets
and of many supervisors, including the Commission bancaire.
Naturally, in keeping with the desire for international harmonisation which guides the implementation
of Basel II, particularly at the European level, in order to be viable and acceptable to all parties, the setting 
of a target ratio in the context of Pillar 2, should be part of an international framework in which there is 
a consensus regarding this type of instrument or the achievement of a similar result. The conclusions
of the discussions currently under way, in which the French authorities intend to play a leading role,
will be decisive in this regard. 